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The Rise of Neoliberalism and the
Termination of Keynesian Policies:
A Multilevel Governance Analysis of
the Closure of the Amsterdam
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By looking at the policy termination of state aid to shipbuilders in
Amsterdam, this article illustrates how a major policy paradigm
shift within recent history, and the change from Keynesian to
neoliberal policies, can be explained. The article is informed by a
multilevel governance approach to policy change analysis and is
based on different types of sources. It presents an in-depth case
study of the closing of the Amsterdam shipyards and analyzes the
role of policy change at different governance levels (i.e., city gov-
ernment, national Parliament, national government, and the
European Commission). In doing so, we are able to illustrate how
new actors—in this case the European Commission and the Com-
missioner for Competition—were able to terminate long-existing
policies of state aid to shipbuilders under the auspices of improving
competition and the free market at the start of the 1980s.
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Introduction
Shipbuilding was one of the pillars of the Dutch economy after World
War II. In 1970, about 5 percent of the total labor force worked in
shipbuilding, more than in any other Western European country.1
The large yards were concentrated in the two largest harbors of the
Netherlands: Rotterdam and Amsterdam. To be able to compete with
Japan, the Netherlands followed the European policy of centralization
of activities. Concrete examples are the series of mergers of the main
Amsterdam shipyards into an ever-expanding conglomerate. Eventu-
ally, Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV) was established in 1971: This
conglomerate combined 117 individual companies and employed
20,000 workers, of whom an estimated quarter worked in the Amster-
dam dockyards. In the years following the merger, the government, in
close cooperation with the trade unions and the management of RSV,
initiated the restructuring of the shipyards tomake themmore efficient
and competitive. This policy contributed to an increasing divide
between north and south, in which the cities of Amsterdam (north,
Amsterdam Drydock Corporation [ADM] and Netherlands Dockyard
and Shipbuilding Corporation [NDSM]) and Rotterdam (south,
shipyards such as Verolme, Wilton-Feijenoord, and Rotterdamsche
Droogdok Maatschappij RDM), supported by the local unions and
workers, tried to prevent their yards from being closed.2 Moreover, this
policy was costly. Over the years, the national government supported
the RSV with 2.7 billion guilders (worth €2.25 billion in 2018).
Shipbuildinghad amajor impact onurbanpolicymaking. Looking at
Amsterdam, the development of the harbor clearly had been the main
focus of economic development initiatives in the city to provide jobs
and economic growth after World War II. The two main RSV company
shipyards (NDSM andADM)were located in the north of Amsterdam, a
working-class area with traditionally high levels of unemployment.3
The city government actively lobbied for government support in The
Hague after the RSV conglomerate was hit by the effects of the first oil
crisis of 1973 and encountered stiff competition from Southeast Asian
shipbuilders from the 1970s onward.
Parliament was another actor. In the 1970s, Parliament was strongly
opposed to closing shipyards, in order to bolster employment, even if
the shipyards were losing money. In 1983, the RSV conglomerate
suddenly went bankrupt. Parliament was in shock and initiated a par-
liamentary inquiry into the causes of this failure. The parliamentary
1. Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 155.
2. Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 155–163.
3. Bosscher, “De oude en de nieuwe stad.”
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inquiry (itself amedia event, as itwas the first inquiry to be broadcast on
television), contributed to a major shift in economic policy: from
Keynesian state-supported industrialization with the aim of protecting
jobs to aneoliberal policywith a focus on cost-cutting, competition, and
efficiency. Although the Amsterdam city government protested, it
could not prevent this shift.
To fully understand this policy paradigm shift, one must also con-
sider the changing role of and pressure from the European Community.
Particularly from 1980 onward, a series of European Commission
(EC) directives had urged curtailing state aid to shipbuilders; these acts
were supported by rulings of the EuropeanCourt that contained the first
fines for illicit state aid. As a result of these pressures from different
governance levels, the RSV conglomerate was split up between 1983
and 1986. In the long run, only a few former RSV activities would
survive.
This article focuses on the decline of shipyards in the city of Amster-
dam to understand how a policy paradigm shift from Keynesian to
neoliberal policies occurred in recent history. By Keynesian policy
wemean policies inspired by the assumption that that the government
has to guarantee (full) employment by stimulating economic growth
through government spending (demandmanagement). The assumption
of this management of aggregated demand economics is that govern-
ment spendingwill lead to proportionally higher economic growth (the
multiplier effect). Moreover, the state should guide the national econ-
omy primarily through a permanent program of large-scale public
investments. Just as important for Keynes was the microeconomic
aspect of unregulated competition, which—especially during times of
economic crisis—leads to unemployment, excess capacity, and suffer-
ing. He believed that the state should therefore act by introducing
“regulated competition”4 in which, in the words of Nobel laureate
economist EdmundPhelps, “the government [had] to assist the ongoing
movement towards cartels, holding companies, trade associations,
pools and others forms of monopoly power.”5 The limits of this
approach became apparent in the 1970s when stagflation occurred: a
situation of inflation (partly) caused by increasing government spend-
ing and rising unemployment. This situation could not happen accord-
ing to Keynesian economics. As a result, policy makers started to look
for new solutions.6 This gave neoliberalism a chance. Neoliberalism
4. Crotty, “Was Keynes a Corporatist?”
5. Phelps, “Corporatism and Keynes,” 93.
6. Jones, Masters of the Universe, 215 et passim; Tomlinson, Managing the
Economy, 63–87.
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had its roots in the 1930s and consisted of different schools.7 The most
vocal school of neoliberalism that gained influence in the 1970s is the
Chicago School of economists such asMilton Friedman. His neoliberal
politics or neoliberalism can be defined as a combination of a more
restrictive role for the state, as well as a reappraisal of free trade and a
greater role for market forces (competition).8 An important element of
this type of neoliberalism is the economic philosophy of monetarism,
which does not focus on the demand side or on government spending,
but rather on the supply of money to stimulate growth. From a mone-
tarist perspective, inflation is not a sign of government underspending
but of government overspending, which should be countered by
terminating state subsidies and privatization of state assets.9
Althoughmanywould agree that this is a periodof crucial changes in
recent history, there are still few historical in-depth case studies of this
policy change. And some crucial players, such as the EC, are often not
included in analyses of shifts in Dutch economic policy.10 The
duration of the closure of the Amsterdam shipyards—it took almost
two decades—and the availability of sources on the role of different
actors makes this a case in point to highlight how the Keynesian
economic policy approach was replaced by a new neoliberal economic
policy approach, backed by the EC. In addition, this is a study into how
policies are terminated: After the RSV scandal, the protection of
employment in vulnerable (urban) regions ceased to be a major deter-
minant in decisions surrounding economic aid to industry. Finally, as
mentioned earlier, the role of different governance levels is analyzed to
understand this shift. Therefore, the article contributes to the use of the
multilevel governance approach in history, which is also an under-
utilized perspective in history.11
In the first section, we explain why it is insightful to understand this
transformation as a policy paradigm shift. Moreover, we also introduce
here the multilevel governance approach in relation to the theme of
howpolicies are terminated. In the second section, the two shipyards of
Amsterdam and their merger into the RSV conglomerate in 1971 are
further discussed. The third section shows how the Amsterdam case
reflects the European model of concentration and subsidies in ship-
building in the 1970s. The fourth section tells the story of the changing
European state aid policy. The fifth section shows the struggle of the
7. Plehwe, “Introduction.”
8. Warlouzet, Governing Europe; Hall, “Policy Paradigms,” 284; Stone, Good-
bye to All That?, 180, 181.
9. Ther, Europe Since 1989; Burgin, The Great Persuasion.
10. See, e.g., Van Zanden, “The History of an Empty Box.”
11. Stephenson, “Twenty Years of Multi-level Governance”; Van Meurs,Never
Mind the Gap.
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city of Amsterdam to find support for its dockyards in the 1980s, and
how first the EC and then the national Parliament were reluctant to
provide it. Finally, the sixth section discusses parallels with develop-
ments in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
Policy Termination and Multilevel Governance
One of the aims of this article is to explain how policies are terminated
and replaced by others. Policy termination became a subject of study in
the late 1970s. It was the last step of the then influential policy cycle
method. In this model, termination would be the logical end for unsuc-
cessful policies. However, in practice, termination could hardly be
observed.12 Policy termination is defined as “the deliberate conclusion
or cessation of specific government functions, programs, policies, or
organizations.”13 In the early 1980s, an academic consensus emerged
that there were three criteria for policy termination: financial reasons
(budget cuts), governmental (in)efficiencies, and changing political ide-
ologies. DeLeon emphasized that “althoughperhaps themost difficult to
defend and to define of the three termination criteria, political ideology
has increasingly been forwarded as the basic cause or motivating factor
in program terminations and budget reductions.”14 By the mid-1990s,
ideological reasons were named as the most decisive for policy termi-
nation.15 Geva-May, inspired by Kingdon’s theory on policy windows,
explained that policy proposals “may require years of ‘softening up’ but
that shifts of ideology, national mood, or crisis—political, economic, or
legislative shifts and changes of personnel—can bring issues up on the
public agenda and prompt window openings.”16
To better understand major changes in ideology, we have to turn to
the research on policy paradigm shifts. The notion of policy paradigms
was popularized by the political scientist Peter Hall, an exponent of
historic institutionalism in policy sciences in the years around 1990.
Hall’s concept of policy paradigms was based on Thomas Kuhn’s con-
cept of “paradigm shifts.” Kuhn argued that scientific revolutions are
not the result of linear developments but that they are sudden ruptures,
which should be partly understood as the result of new insights and
partly as a result of a new consensus in a scientific community about
12. Bardach, “Policy Termination as a Political Process”; DeLeon, “Public Pol-
icy Termination.”
13. Brewer and DeLeon, The Foundations of Policy Analysis, cited in Daniels,
“Policy and Organizational Termination,” 250.
14. DeLeon, “Policy Evaluation and Program Termination,” 636.
15. Harris, “Policy Termination.”
16. Geva-May, “Riding the Wave of Opportunity,” 320. Emphasis in original.
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what is scientific truth. Although other paradigms do exist, the new
consensus favors one paradigm over others, resulting in alternative
paradigms not being seen as valid at the same time.17 Informed byKuhn
(and also byHeclo’s notions on social learning by civil servants),18 Hall
argues that establishing consensus on what is the best public policy
takes place in the context of a wider, changing discursive framework.
How policy is debated and understood determines the “very nature of
the problems… Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very
terminology through which policymakers communicate about their
work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for
granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this
interpretive framework a policy paradigm.” By using the notion of
policy paradigm, Hall has explained Britain’s radical shift from
Keynesian to neoliberal policies between 1970 and 1989. During this
policy paradigm shift, all three components of policy changed: “the
instruments’ setting, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of
the goals behind the policy.”19
Since Hall’s work, the approach to understanding paradigm shifts
has been further developed. An influential group of scholars has argued
that long periods of stability and policy continuity are being disrupted
by short and intense periods of change. Existing policy paradigms are
socially constructed and dominant in a given policy system; they tend
to reinforce themselves and are static. During a policy paradigm shift, it
is likely that a dominant policy community is being replaced or that
new political actors intervene.20 The growing dominance of the EC in
the 1980s toward the formation of a single market in 1992 means that
the EC could be considered a player initiating a paradigm shift, as we
will further discuss later.21 A second group of scholars has argued that
paradigm shifts are much more gradual and incremental and some
aspects of former policies remain in place, while others are changed.22
An example of the second group is the work of political scientists
Princen and Van Esch on changing policy paradigms in subsequent
versions of the Stability Growth Pact of the EuropeanMonetary Union.
They found that changes were gradual and that differing paradigms
could even be present in a policy “without undermining the internal
consistency of the argument.”23 The problem with the gradual and
incremental policy paradigm is that it is difficult to see the difference
17. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
18. Wilder, “What Is a Policy Paradigm?”
19. Hall, “Policy Paradigms,” 279.
20. Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.”
21. E.g., Ludlow, “Jacques Delors.”
22. E.g., Mahoneyand and Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change.
23. Princen and Van Esch, “Paradigm Formation and Paradigm Change,” 372.
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between policy theories and paradigms, and that it goes beyond the fact
that policy paradigms, because of their Kuhnian origins, should be rare
and should lead to a radical if not revolutionary process.24 It is sug-
gested that one should see policy theories as “operationalization” of
policy paradigms, that the impact of an paradigm change runs through
change in policy theories.25 Scholars of policy termination have argued
that the “explosion-type ending” is themost common form—it is likely
that the paradigm shift will be disruptive and therefore easy to identify
because of the stark contrast produced by this kind of ending.26 In sum,
the concept of paradigm shifts is useful for historians, because it
enhances our understanding of how a radical change in discourse has
a performative effect on politics and policy: It changes the substance of
policy—in our case in the form of a termination.27
The concept of paradigm shifts also makes us sensitive to the fact
that oftennewactors are responsible for a radical policy change. For our
case, the sources confirm that different governance levels were
involved in this process of change: the city of Amsterdam, the national
Parliament, the government, and the European Community were the
main actors. Trade unions and the management of shipyards also
played a role, but to a lesser degree, as we will see. Because of the roles
of different actors, the multilevel governance approach also informs
research on policy paradigm shift. This approach has tried to offer a
non-state and noncentric view on politics and policy to explain the
transfer of (some) power from the nation-states and central govern-
ments in Europe to the supranational institutions of the European
Community in the 1980s.28 Marks has emphasized the importance of
ideas to understand changes taking place in three dimensions: political
mobilization, that is, as the actors’ attempt to influence the existing
distribution of power and ideas (politics); policy-making arrangements
(policy); and state structures (polity).29 Political scientists Marks,
Hooghe, and Blank argued that although “Brussels” became more
important, nationally elected politicians continued to be influential
as well.30 In the last decade, multilevel governance studies have also
included the urban level.31 Cities are especially viewed now as “an
24. Daigneault, “Reassessing the Concept of Policy Paradigm.”
25. Princen and 't Hart, “Putting Policy Paradigms in Their Place.”
26. Bardach, “Policy Termination as a Political Process,” 125.
27. For historical representation, this intertwining of style and substance is
explained in Ankersmit, Historical Representation. For its occurrence in politics,
see Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics.
28. Hooghe and Marks,Multi-level Governance, 28.
29. Piattoni, “Multi‐level Governance.”
30. Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, “European Integration from the 1980s,” 342.
31. Gustavsson, Elander, and Lundmark, “Multilevel Governance.”
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essential politicalmechanism throughwhich aprofound andgeograph-
ical transformation of national states has been occurring,” while city
regions have become institutional players to which policy-making
powers have been transferred from the national state level.32 Hence,
thismakes us sensitive to the role ofAmsterdam in this case. So, by now
we know that a clear hierarchy between different government levels is
no longer fixed and in-depth case studies are required to find out their
precise roles.
In short, by combining the concept of policy paradigm shifts with the
multilevel governance approach,we hypothesize that the termination of
policies is the result of a policy paradigm shift, itself the result of actions
at different governance levels. To be able to establish that a paradigm
shift took place, it is not necessary that the newparadigm is embraced by
everyone. Or, as Kuhn explains: “To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory
must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never
does, explain all the facts it can be confrontedwith.” Those who remain
followers of the old views “are simply read out of the profession, which
thereafter ignores theirwork.”33 Informedby these considerations, in the
following sections wewill analyze if, and if so, how and in what form, a
paradigm shift took place in historical reality.
Forced National Mergers to Acquire Subsidies
TheAmsterdamharbor had been themain focus of the economic devel-
opment programs of the city in order to provide jobs and economic
growth after World War II. The two main shipyards in Amsterdam—
NDSM and ADM—were located in the north of Amsterdam, a working-
class area with high levels of unemployment. In the 1960s, the two
dockyards started to be locked in at their location, as the maximum
depth andwidth of their ships were dictated by a sea lock and the canal
toAmsterdam’s harbor.34 TheNDSMhad approximately 3,500workers
at the end of the 1960s, while 1,500 workers were employed by the
ADM dockyards. NDSM was one of the seven large shipbuilding com-
panies in the Netherlands, nicknamed the “Seven Sisters.” NDSM and
ADM were responsible for 9 percent of the total employment in the
Dutch shipbuilding and ship repair sector, which consisted of
252 (mainly small) companies in total in 1967.35
32. Brenner, New State Spaces.
33. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 17–19.
34. Bosscher, “De oude en de nieuwe stad,” 351.
35. Figures from Van der Velden, “The Dutch Shipbuilding Industry; Strath,
The Politics of De-industrialization, 157.
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After World War II, to promote the reconstruction of the economy
based on industrialization, the Dutch government had introduced a
policy of wage restraint. The economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s,
which made trade unions ask for higher wages, eventually brought an
end to this “guided wage policy” in the early 1960s. As a result, wages
in the Netherlands—which had been amongst the lowest—now were
among the highest in Europe, which had a great effect on labor-
intensive sectors such as shipbuilding. These sectors were also the first
to see rising unemployment from 1967 onward.36 In a period in which
the image of the “crisis of the 1930s” was still fresh and alive, Parlia-
ment asked the government to form a committee to research the ship-
building sector in the Netherlands, which it feared was starting to
decline. Indeed, the Netherlands had dropped from being the third
producer of ships globally in the 1930s to number fourteen in the
1960s. The Keyzer commission (named after its chairman
M.J. Keyzer), consisting of bankers, dockyard owners and shipowners,
unionists, and government representatives, first recommended the pro-
vision of subsidies, which had become commonplace in other
European countries by 1966. Second, the Keyzer commission con-
cluded that the industry was relying too heavily on craftsmanship
and therefore had to industrialize by introducing new production
methods and to specialize by focusing on specific ship types in order
to catch up with foreign competitors. Building supertankers for oil
transport was seen as especially profitable. “The report was a master-
piece of social and economic architecture, a monument to an epoch
when there was a strong belief that society’s difficulties could be mas-
tered by rational and determined action,” according to Bo Strath. Strath
also shows that the findings of the Keyzer commission were similar to
conclusions drawn in West Germany and in the United Kingdom
(e.g., the Geddes Report).37
The Keyzer report was turned into policy. In 1968, the Rotterdam-
based shipbuilder Verolme was forced by the national government to
buy and integrate the unprofitable NDSM shipyard into Verolme activ-
ities in order to secure government loans for a super dry dock of
400 meters. Both new builds and ship repairs had ceased to be profit-
able for NDSM; the only profitable builds were mammoth tankers. As
these ships had grown larger than the width of the sea locks in the
Amsterdamport, the director of NDSM (Piet Goedkoop)was convinced
that his company would never be profitable again and that no Dutch
36. Van Zanden, The Economic History of the Netherlands, 81; Van Zanden,
“The History of an Empty Box,” 184.
37. Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 158, 159.
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shipbuilder would be able to compete with the Japanese.38 However,
the merger did continue.
Against this background, three years later the nationalized supercon-
glomerate of shipyardsnamedRijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV)was formed.
Only one large national shipbuilder out of the Seven Sisters managed to
retain its independence, namely the ADM. The ADMwas able to main-
tain its autonomy for several years, but would become part of the RSV in
1978.The argument for the formationof theRSVwas capacity reduction,
but soon the conglomerate agreed that the future of the struggling dock-
yards of Amsterdam had to be “to sustain employment as much as
possible, while finding the most neutral solution in terms of distortion
of competition.”39 The Amsterdam shipyards of the conglomerate were
forced to absorb the losses of the NDSM and, when ADM joined RSV in
1978, were split into two companies working under existing labels:
NDSM would become responsible for building new ships, while all
the repair work of the NDSM would go to the ADM, which would
become solely a ship repair facility.40 The president-director of RSV
(former politician and minister Dirk Stikker), as well as other members
of the executive board, preferred to close NDSM at that point. However,
this was unthinkable for the Amsterdam city government as well as for
the national government: “[The Ministry of] Economic Affairs was
against such rigorous actions. In the social-political climate of these days
such far reachingmeasureswere absolutely impossible,” as Stikker later
explained during the parliamentary inquiry.41 The position of the Min-
istry of Economic Affairs was actively supported by the Ministry of
Social Affairs, which took it for granted that “their policy was a derivate
of the Economic Affairs priorities as given.”42
The industrial sector of the Netherlands as a whole was severely
affected by the recessions of the 1970s. The textile, clothing, and shoe-
making industries lost about 70 percent of their workforce between
1970 and 1984. Shipbuilding and engineering, which were at the heart
of the industrialization policy of the 1950s, were struggling with stag-
nating output. The official industrial policy of the Netherlands was
ended in 1963, but this did not end the state’s involvement in industry.
The government launched new policies—which have been labeled as
“industrial policies without a plan”43—in which larger firms were
38. Kamerstuk II 1984/5, 17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 16, 30, 31 and nr. 21, 5.
39. Kamerstuk II 1984/5, 17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 16, 93.
40. Van der Velden, “The Dutch Shipbuilding Industry”; Kamerstuk II 1984/5,
17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 16, 171, 172; VanRomburgh and Spits,Nederlandsche Dok
en Scheepsbouw Maatschappij.
41. President-director Stikker in Kamerstuk 1984/5, 17 718, nr. 21, p. 1422.
42. Wassenberg, Dossier RSV, 224, 225.
43. Van Zanden, “The History of an Empty Box,” 185.
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created in an attempt to increase international competitiveness.
Inspired by the UK example of the Industrial Reorganisation Corpora-
tion, the Dutch employers asked the Dutch government to set up a
similar organization: in 1972, the tripartite (consisting of unions,
employers, and the government) Nederlandse Herstructurerings-
maatschappij (Dutch Reorganization Corporation) was founded. The
Reorganization Corporation’s goal was to help labor-intensive
medium-sized firms—for example, in cigar making, leather shoes,
and textiles—to compete in an increasingly open world market by
merging them into large firms and restructuring them.44 The corpora-
tion proved to be unsuccessful, because funding remained limited and
the differences between enterprises weremuch larger than anticipated.
This conglomeration and restructuring strategy was also taken up by
the large industrial companies of the Netherlands (i.e., Philips, Akzo,
OGEM, Van Gelder). Restructuring proved difficult, as making people
redundant was “frowned upon” in the 1970s, as business historian
Keetie Sluyterman argued.45 As a result, the government was pulled
into state aid and subsidizing individual companies.46 Between 1975
and 1985, approximately €6 billion (in 2012 prices) in various kinds of
aid were provided to individual companies, including large manufac-
turers, such as DAF, Volvo Car, Fokker, Stork, and Hoogovens.47
Nonetheless, the sector that was subsidized the most was the ship-
building sector.48 In the 1970s the RSV conglomerate was severely hit
by the effects of the oil crises and encountered stiff competition from
Southeast Asia. Over the years, the national government supported the
conglomeratewith 2.7 billion guilders,without reporting the payouts to
Parliament. However, when the restructuring process did not show the
expected results, the executive board came to view the problems pri-
marily as a government concern, as it was the government who had
ordered the maintenance of high employment rates. The executive
board therefore expected to receive more state subsidies, favorable
loans, and investments in return. Alternatively, as Jan van den Brink
(a member of the supervisory board) stated in 1977:
Here one has to deal with participation, in which the general concern
for employment plays a role. In that interest, RSV did not cut jobs and
did not restructure at such a pace as was economically necessary.
44. Ben Dankbaar and Velzing, “Industriebeleid in Nederland,” 7; Hesseling,
“Strategische besluitvorming,” 180–182, 263–266
45. Sluyterman, Dutch Enterprise in the Twentieth Century, 194.
46. Sluyterman, Dutch Enterprise in the Twentieth Century, 146.
47. Van Zanden, Een klein land in de 20e eeuw; Dankbaar and Velzing, “Indus-
triebeleid in Nederland,” 9.
48. Van Zanden, “The History of an Empty Box,” 187.
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The company could expect the government, which with RSV con-
ducted and supported this policy, to take its responsibility and accept
the consequences.49
The president of the supervisory board, Jan de Vries, testified to the
parliamentary inquiry: “I assumed that because of how RSV worked—
and I know that it is somewhat overstated—that this social workplace
would not fall over because of large scale socio-political consider-
ations.”50
By December 1977, the situation had once again worsened as it
became clear that the crisis was not a temporary one. Thus, any hope
that by 1980 a new equilibrium would be found in the market with
higher prices proved to be futile. Moreover, RSV had demonstrated
itself unable to lower its costs by increasing productivity and efficiency.
It also becameclear that the losses of thedivision for building large, new
ships was damaging the conglomerate as a whole. The government
established a tripartite “policy committee” (Beleidscommissie) made
up of civil servants, dockyard owners, and unions tasked with making
recommendations for reducing the overcapacity in shipbuilding. The
committeewasunanimously in favor of closing the economicallyweak-
est yards, whichwouldmake 2,000 people in Amsterdam (and 2,500 in
Rotterdam) redundant. In return the RSV would receive 800 million
guilders from various forms of state aid, and on top of that the Ministry
of Social Affairs would support the discharged workers.51 This quickly
led to a new controversy: the north–south conflict, in which an entire
yard in either Amsterdam or Rotterdam would need to be closed. The
Amsterdam-based NDSM was chosen for closure. This decision led to
serious tensions within the unions: The local Amsterdam branch
pleaded to leave the Beleidscommissie, while the Rotterdam branch
pleaded to stay in.52
The 1978 attempt to close the NDSMmet stiff opposition in Amster-
dam, not only from the local trade union; all political parties from the
local council sympathized with and encouraged the workers, who in a
famous strike occupied the shipyard. The strike was organized by the
local branch of the biggest Dutch unionNKV-NVV (known as FNV from
1981) andwasnot backedby solidarity strikes elsewhere in the country.
The future of the ADM was intentionally included in these actions,
which were supported by other local groups, such as municipal
workers of neighboring cities and the women’s movement. Strikingly,
49. Kamerstuk II 1984/5, 17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 18, 225 and 226.
50. Kamerstuk II 1984/5, 17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 21, 1185.
51. Wassenberg, Dossier RSV, 229.
52. Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 163, 164, 173–175.
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the European Economic Communitywas attacked in the protests as one
of the driving forces behind the attempts to close the shipyards.53
Moreover, in response to the protests, the city government announced
it was prepared to invest money in the NDSM. Alderman Enneüs
Heerma of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the unions were the
architects of a plan in which the ADM repair facility, which seemed
profitable, could be used to cushion unemployment by taking over
unprofitable parts of the NDSM.54 The fact that the occupation-strike
was frequently visited by national politicians canvassing for provincial
and senate elections contributed toward an overwhelming majority of
seats from both the opposition and the coalition in national Parliament
to speak out against the closure of the two Amsterdam dockyards.55
Consequently, a part of the NDSM was saved in the form of a small
newcompanynamedNederlandse ScheepsbouwMaatschappij (NSM),
in which only 400 of the original 3,000 NDSM workers found employ-
ment. The ADM management was dead against this solution, but was
overruled by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the RSV board of
directors, which received an extra aid packet to adjust the measures in
Amsterdam.56 Nine hundred fifty NDSM workers were transferred to
the ADM as part of a social plan for NDSMworkers.57 The state and the
city of Amsterdam became shareholders of NSM; Amsterdam bought
the same number of shares that the national government already pos-
sessed and guaranteed loans.58 The NSM was also promised orders
from theRSVconglomerate, but all parties involved seemed to be aware
of the fact that this would not be the last attempt to rescue attempt of
NSM, or RSV.59
The European Crisis in Shipbuilding in the 1970s
The overall confidence in Europe that building supertankers would
rescue their struggling shipbuilding industry was based on the years
1967–1973, when the demand for super oil tankers was much larger
53. VanRomburgh andSpits,NederlandscheDok en ScheepsbouwMaatschap-
pij, 62.
54. “Amsterdam wil in nieuwe werf delen: Nieuwe hoop voor NDSM,” NRC
Handelsblad, September 11, 1978; “Amsterdam bereid tot steun werfcombinatie,”
De Telegraaf, September, 11, 1978, 1.
55. See Rijksmuseum, Foto-opdrachten Nederlandse geschiedenis: documen-
tatie: Verkiezingsstrijd '81; photos of Paul Babeliowsky; Wassenberg, Dossier RSV,
244.
56. Wassenberg, Dossier RSV, 230, 243, 244.
57. Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 178.
58. Kamerstuk II 1980/81, 14 969, nr. 65.
59. Kamerstuk II 1984/5, 17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 16, 487.
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than the supply. This made the real value of a delivered tanker higher
than the contract price. As a result, a speculative market of preordered
tankers emerged.60 The first oil crisis of 1973 liquidated this market
and, due to the significant time lag in shipbuilding, overproduction
drove the prices in shipbuilding down after 1973. The demand for
Western European tankers diminished further as new South Asian
competitors could produce ships at a much lower price. The super-
groupings and other conglomerates did not deliver on the promises of
cost sharing and modernization, and thus became heavily subsidized
conglomerates. The subsidies were initially given to enable shipyards
to weather the storm of the first oil crisis, but when the market did not
recover, they quickly became a structural policy tool to protect employ-
ment in the dockyards across Europe.
Government pressure to form shipbuilding and industrial conglom-
erates can be observed in manyWestern European countries. From the
mid-1960s a common belief emerged that stiff competition—at that
time with Japan—could be countered by merging individual compa-
nies into regional groups. In doing so, companies could modernize by
sharing the costs of research and development, as well as construct
large ships, which needed new, large, dry docks that were expensive
to build. This regionalization was typically accompanied by subsidies
for reorganization, the commissioning of ships, and low-interest loans
for ship purchases. For example, in the United Kingdom the formation
of super-groupings was adopted by the government, which steered
decision making in individual companies; mergers were guided by
coordinating and regulatory boards and committees. In 1977, ship-
buildingwas almost completely nationalized in theUnitedKingdom.61
France is also an insightful example. Initially, the liberal president
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–1981) introduced a new industrial pol-
icy that decreased direct subsidies to shipbuilding. However, three
years later in 1977, aid was resumed after intensive lobbying. France
did not follow a concentration policy: All five shipbuilding production
sides were maintained in order to support the economy and employ-
ment in the regions. From 1977 onward, a cartel was all but officially
formed; the cartel gave orders to the weakest company and decided to
keep its production capacity under 70 percent.62
Shipbuilding in West Germany was a small sector on the federal
level, but responsible for 15.4 percent and 6.4 percent of the total
employment in Bremen and Hamburg, respectively. Moreover,
60. Connors, “The Decline of British Shipbuilding,” 35.
61. Connors, “TheDecline of BritishShipbuilding”; Parker,TheOfficialHistory
of Privatisation, 202.
62. Warlouzet, “The Collapse of the French Shipyard of Dunkirk.”
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70 percent of Germany’s shipbuilding capacity was produced by just
five private companies, whose shipyards were brutally hit by the
declining demand and overproduction of the 1970s. Between 1975
and 1984, capacity was reduced by 60 percent, and the dockyards
started a process of coordinated specialization. This reduced the num-
ber of jobs considerably; in Bremen one-third of the jobs in shipbuild-
ing disappeared between 1975 and 1982. The consolidation strategy is
also visible here, for example, in the attempts to merge the big Bremen
dockyards of Weser and Bremen Vulkan and the formation of a
Verbund—a consortium with the shipping company Hapag-Lloyd.63
It was seen as the solution for the survival of the Bremen shipbuilding
industry. However, it also illustrated how the company had become
too big to fail. As a member of the executive board told Bremen’s
Parliament in a parliamentary inquiry of 1998: “The managers of the
shipyards knew that the policy of the Land was to do everything
possible to maintain jobs.”64
The Public Turn in European State Aid of the 1980s
The political economists Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger have
convincingly argued that state aid is “deeply political and needs to be
understood in a broader context.”65 This notion has been reinforced by
theFrenchhistorianof globalizationLaurentWarlouzet,who studied the
influence of neoliberalismon theECand its state aid policies and labeled
this policy field as “the main vehicle for a neoliberal transformation of
Europe.”66However, as theneoliberal changehas come to include a great
variety of things that occurred from the late 1970s onward, we need to
study in depth and in detail whether a policy paradigm shift—from
Keynesian to neoliberal policy—took place, and if so, why, how, and
inwhat form. This can be done by analyzing the general changing policy
discourse and the policy area–specific discourses and their effect on
policy theory and policy in practice.67 In doing so, we can find
out whether a change in all three dimensions—politics, policy, and
63. Wolf points out that: “The history of Bremer Vulkan is similar to the trans-
formations in the West German shipbuilding industry in general.” Wolf, “Bremer
Vulkan,” 117.
64. Seevaratnam, Governing the Shipyards, 59–73, 133–150, quote p. 136. In
1996 the Parliament (Die Bürgerschaft) of Bremen introduced parlamentarischen
Untersuchungsausschuß “Bremer Vulkan.” The report of the parliamentary enquiry
committee was delivered in 1998.
65. Buch-Hansen and Wigger, “Revisiting 50 Years of Market-Making.”
66. Warlouzet, Governing Europe, 13, 156–181; Warlouzet, “Competition.”
67. Hall, “Policy Paradigms.”
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polity—did indeed take place, as well as who was responsible for it. We
argue that such a change did take place and that the role of the EC was
crucial.68
Shipbuilding was one of the few economic activities clearly speci-
fied in the articles of the European Economic Community’s founda-
tional treaty (EEC Treaty) of Rome (1957), where it was stated in article
93(3c) that aid to shipbuilders to compensate for the loss of customs
protection should be “progressively reduced.”69 Up until 1973, the EC
was not very active in promoting competition or in curtailing state aid.
The first oil crisis of 1973 and increasing competition in shipbuilding
even led to a sharp increase of state aid measures in the member states,
which in turnmade it impossible for the EC to enforce its state aid rules.
State aid was seen as a legitimate way to provide social policy and to
prevent unemployment by member states, as well as (to some extent)
the EC and the European Court. Throughout the 1970s, the role of the
Directorate-General (IV) for Competition was actively hindered by
member states and the official obligation to inform the EC of new state
aid was widely ignored up until the early 1980s.70 DG IV “had been
reduced to asking for information [on state aid] and could do littlemore
than plan policy in the abstract, given the way that member states
flagrantly disregarded the rules and rulings, especiallywhere declining
industries such as steel, shipbuilding and textiles were concerned.”71
The EC started to change its view after the second oil crisis of 1979,
when it became clear that protective measures were not temporary, as
the European regulations required them to be. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, informed by new economic theories, the belief grew within the
EC that state aid was a form of market distortion that prevented eco-
nomic recovery.72 This became visible in the 1978 declaration by the
EC,which stated that the economic problems of themember stateswere
“of a basic structural nature” and that they had to be addressed before
economic recovery could begin. The EC was very clear in dismissing
Keynesian solutions in the form of state aid to overcome the crisis.73
It had three “undeniable reasons” for this:
(i) The customs union would be quite useless and would collapse if
Member States could invalidate it by granting aids; (ii) the Common
Market makes little sense unless businesses tackle the market on the
strength of their own resourceswithout any aid to distort competition
68. Buch-Hansen and Wigger, “Revisiting 50 Years of Market-Making,” 22.
69. Article 93 3c, Treaty of Rome (1957).
70. López, The Concept of State Aid, 49, 50.
71. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe, 503.
72. López, The Concept of State Aid, 50–52.
73. López, The Concept of State Aid, 50, 51.
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between them … and (iii) lastly, and as a corollary, a system which
leaves the field open for competition and does not allow aids to
interfere with the optimum distribution of production factors is
essential to economic and social progress.74
As a second step, in 1980 the EC wrote a letter warning the member
states about a drop in the rate of notifications of planned state aid to the
EC, such notifications being an obligation under the EEC Treaty. Some
countries failed to notify at all, while others gave the EC insufficient
time to respond.75
The appointment and role of a new commissioner for competition,
Frans Andriessen (1981–1985), serves as an example of the changing
role of the EC as well. Andriessen was a Christian Democrat and a
former minister of finance in the Netherlands who had resigned in
1980 after the center-right coalition government decided to not back
his monetarist policies and pleas for budget cuts to counter the eco-
nomic recession—the biggest defeat of his career. Andriessen was only
51 and therefore eager to find a new job. He knew little about the EEC or
the EC; however, after talking to experienced leading EEC civil servants
EdmundWellerstein andMax Kohnstamm, he opted for commissioner
of competition, at that time still a minor post.76 It was a period of
Eurosclerosis and low trust in EC chairman Gaston Thorn (former
prime minister of Luxembourg). To reclaim ground, the EC focused
on two sectors—steel and shipbuilding—as it had a history of legisla-
ture in those areas. Additionally, aid from member states to those
sectors was substantive.77
Andriessen was aware that the role of DG Competition had to be
changed: “Competition was a completely closed DG. My predecessor
was aman quite tight-lipped apparently. And I opened the window.”78
His senior staff clearly saw the change. His deputy director-general,
Jean Louis Cadieux, noticed that “with Andriessen you saw a change in
politics, a will to be more determined.”79 Andriessen thought that DG
IV had operated too “abstractly … theoretical[ly].” He appointed
Manfred Caspari as director-general. “Caspari was more open, he was
more of an entrepreneur who had a lot of knowledge of what really
happened in the practical economy, not in theory, but in the real-life
economy.”80 Caspari shared his commissioner’s energy and proposed a
74. COM (78) 221 final, AEI.
75. Cownie, “State Aid in the Eighties,” 247.
76. Merriënboer, “Een monument van een commissaris,” 212, 214, 230.
77. HAEU, interview with Cadieux, 6, 7, 21.
78. HAEU, interview with Andriessen, 8.
79. HAEU, interview with Cadieux, 10.
80. HAEU, interview with Andriessen, 9.
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clear agenda for state aid reform: “This sectorwas totally neglected, you
had to reach throughmore vigorously now.”81 Retrospectively, Caspari
stated: “The first year in which I took office as Director-General, I made
the Commission take more negative decisions on state aid than there
had been in the whole period since the founding of the EEC Treaty.”82
The changing views on market distortion and state aid were first
tested in the steel industry, which had structural problems very similar
to those of shipbuilding (i.e., overproduction and an excess of produc-
tion capacity). Steel production was regulated through the European
Community of Steel and Coal Treaty, which held out the possibility of
forming a cartel in times of a “clear crisis.”However, a grouped’analyse
made up by Commissioners Andriessen (Competition), Davignon
(Internal Market, Industrial Affairs), and Ortoli (Economics and
Finance) presented “Plan Davignon” in 1978, in which steel mills were
closed in exchange for a final injection of state aid and a soft landing in
the freemarket through a temporary systemofminimumprices. TheDG
Competition was given the role of implementing the system of mini-
mumprices.83 TheEC succeeded inusing the cartel to implement a new
neoliberal policy of competition and abolishment of state aid.
Shipbuilding was the second large dossier that the DG Competition
took on; the Directorate profited from the preparatory work done in the
steel industry. Director-General Caspari believed that the problems
were similar and that there was a window of opportunity:
This [shipbuilding] was a sector where we took care of it relatively
early, because it had become necessary and because of political pres-
sure.Wehad of course the great advantage that the EC couldnegotiate
directly with the Koreans and about the aid systems. So that one
could say: “When you do not change your system, then we have to
approve aid again.” That was primarily against Korea. And it was
interesting: as soon as the Community had implemented such a sys-
tem, the OECD also started discussing how to organise this. So ship-
building, that was the first sector in which you could systematically
could take care of [state] aid, because of this pressure.84
Based upon its experience in the steel industry, DG IV devised a com-
parable scheme for shipbuilding. In the words of Caspari: “First, we
approve a rationalisation cartel for decommissioning capacity. And
secondly, as long as the market recovery measures are in progress, no
81. HAEU, interview with Caspari, 30.
82. HAEU, interview with Caspari, 17.
83. Feltkamp, “State Aid from the 70s to the 90s”; Rocca, “Four Vignettes,”;
HAEU, interview with Cadieux, 21.
84. HAEU, interview with Caspari, 18.
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penny [of state aid] will be approved.” The formula of a rationalization
cartel and decline of further aid was also used later in “nonessential”
sectorswith “crazy overcapacity,” such as textiles, paper, and synthetic
fibers.85
To implement this new policy for shipbuilding, two new directives
were introduced in quick succession: the fifth directive in 1981 and the
sixth directive in 1987. Both had the aim of banning state aid and
promoting free international trade. The EC by now viewed the prob-
lems in shipbuilding as “structural rather than conjunctural.” This
could only be overcome by seriously reducing overcapacity, although
the EC was aware that shipbuilding was—for some regions—the only
industry and therefore “reduction [could not] take place too rapidly” in
those areas.86 State aid would still be permitted to protect vulnerable
regions. The consequences were, however, clear and harsh: In 1985
overcapacity was calculated to be a third of the complete production
capacity, and the EC forecast that 30,000 jobs would be lost in ship-
building before 1990. The fifth directive aimed to control state aid by
making it transparent and, as a result, aid packages were reduced and
economically rationalized. From 1985 onward, a reorientation of state
subsidies became apparent, and member states started to withdraw or
modify their aid to industry.87 However, indirect aid to shipbuilding in
the form of credit facilities or loan guarantees to shipowners remained
possible, so the sixth directive (1987) pushed further on restructuring
and capacity reduction by curtailing all government aid to a maximum
of 28 percent of the price of a contract. The form of aid (indirect or
direct) was no longer an argument,88 and the ceiling of 28 percent was
annually reviewed and in later years lowered.
Indeed, dramatic changes were witnessed, which began during the
Andriessen–Caspari years. In the decade before 1981, state aidwas only
prohibited in twenty-one cases, but in the four years between 1981 and
1985, the EC prevented fourteen cases.89 On top of that, in 1983
Andriessen decided that from then on the EC would actively recover
illegally granted state aid.90 The famous Boussac ruling by the
European court in 1988 emphasized the EC’s determination on this
matter, forcing the French government to repay more than 300 million
French francs (approximately €82.5 million in 2013) of unlawful aid to
the textile producer; such a repayment by member states would have
85. HAEU, interview with Caspari, 19.
86. Directive 87/167/EEC.
87. López, The Concept of State Aid, 55, 56.
88. Kelly et al., “Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy,” 80.
89. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe, 504.
90. Cownie, “State Aid in the Eighties,” 247.
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been unthinkable only a few years prior.91 In historiography it has
therefore been suggested that “the revival of confidence inside DG IV
[Competition] after 1981” was crucial for this change.92
The signing of the Single European Act (1986) and the progression
toward the establishment of the European single market (1992) were
further stimulants. They created an “economic and intellectual con-
text” wherein a forceful competition and anti–state aid regime could
emerge.93 This was not necessarily a given, because the Single
European Act only discussed state aid reform briefly, as cooperation
between companies was emphasized more heavily.94 The DG Compe-
tition was tremendously helped in its effort to put limitations on state
aid by the DG’s interpretation of the Single European Act and the road
map for establishing a single market in 1992. In the white paper on the
completion of the internal market (June 14, 1985), this new policy is
clearly visible:
It will be particularly important that the Community discipline on
state aids be rigorously enforced. There are tendencies to spend large
amounts of public funds on state aids to uncompetitive industries
and enterprises. Often, they not only distort competition but also in
the long run undermine efforts to increase European competitive-
ness. They represent a drain on scarce public resources and they
threaten to defeat efforts to build the internal market.95
Commissioners Peter Sutherland (1985–1989) and Leon Brittan (1989–
1993) took significant advantage of the occurring paradigm shift, which
resulted in what the political scientists Umut Aydin and Kenneth
Thomas have labeled a “public turn,” in which the DG Competition
“started to more forcefully tackle anti-competitive behaviour of mem-
ber state governments in the form of state aids and public monopo-
lies.”96TheECgained support for its changed state aiddoctrine through
rulings by the European Court of Justice and received explicit support
from the European Parliament.97 From 1992 onward, the EU started to
export its now vested state aid rules to, for example, the World Trade
Organization, as well as to Central and Eastern European countries
aspiring to EU membership.
91. López, The Concept of State Aid, 195.
92. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe, 503–504.
93. Warlouzet, “Competition,” 295-296.
94. Warlouzet, “The Rise of European Competition Policy,” 18
95. White Paper Internal Market COM (85) 310, AEI.
96. Aydin and Thomas, “The Challenges and Trajectories of EU Competition
Policy,” 538; Warlouzet, “Competition,” 298, 299;
97. López, The Concept of State Aid, 52, 195.
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Amsterdam Fights but Parliament Loses Its Appetite for
Subsidies (1981–1986)
How did this public turn affect the Amsterdam shipyards? On
September 17, 1980, the European Court ruled against the Netherlands’
claim that its aid to the tobacco firm Philip Morris was legal. This
famous ruling would have a great effect on all forms of state aid, as it
showed the Court’s determination that the EC had the power to decide
whether state aid was admissible. The Court ruled that market distor-
tion was only allowed to accomplish Community goals. The treaty
allowed this distortion for areas with high unemployment and abnor-
mally low standards of living.98 Because the standard of living in the
Netherlands was well above the European average, this could poten-
tially make aid to Dutch shipbuilders illegal. The second reason the
Philip Morris case became very famous was that it was a “political
landmark … a public statement about DG IV’s right to restrict the
freedom of national and subnational aid-donors in choosing where
and when to grant subsidies.”99
From 1980 onward, we see a clear change in aid policy. First, the
Dutch minister of economic affairs started to decrease new aid
attempts. The government’s reluctance led to tensions between govern-
ment representatives on the onehand and the owners and theunions on
the other hand. The owners kept actively seeking state aid to support
their dwindling capital position, while from 1978 onward the unions
lost their belief in economic restructuring and started to follow a “sur-
vival strategy” aimed at keeping dismissals at a minimum.100 In 1981,
the FNV left the tripartite committee for the national restructuring of
shipbuilding towholeheartedly support local protests, but it alsomeant
that the union lost its influence on softening the impact of closures.101
After the famous 1978 NDSM strike, strikes were rarely employed in
shipbuilding. According to Sjaak Van der Velden, who has researched
strikes in shipbuilding, workers had lost confidence because of the
crisis within the industry. Even during the national strikes of 1980
and 1982, most of them continued working in their yards.102 This
was another reason that the unions could not play a large role in soft-
ening the impact of closures. The attempt in 1984 of the FNV to form a
unified front with the owners of the yards came too late, as by 1984 the
98. ECLI:EU:C:1980:209.
99. Michelle Cini as quoted in Thomas, Competing for Capital, 113, 114.
100. Wassenberg, Dossier RSV, 228.
101. Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 180.
102. Van der Velden, “The Dutch Shipbuilding Industry,” 233, 234, 238.
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owners had adopted the same position as government “that the market
ultimately had to decide on the future of the industry.”103
In the meantime, NSM continued to struggle in a declining market,
the EC saw it as a “crisis within the crisis”with prices and orders taking
another plunge, while overcapacity increased even further.104 In
February 1981, Parliament unanimously asked the government to sus-
tain aid giving to NSM. However, the minister of economic affairs, Gijs
van Aardenne, was reluctant to do so.105 The board of directors was
unpleasantly surprised, it had counted on support: “Perhaps we were
toomuch an entrepreneur and too little a politician. Whenwe knocked
at the door of Economic Affairs we had the impression that the govern-
ment would meet our wishes.”106 After conducting his own research,
Van Aardenne “had the opinion that for NSM there were not enough
future opportunities to justify additional government aid.” The city of
Amsterdam continued to ask for aid and even had conceived a rescue
planworth at least 25million guilders (the equivalent of approximately
€23.5million in 2018). On the same day that the city published its plan,
the DG Competition (headed by Andriessen) voiced its concerns to the
minister of economic affairs: Aid from the city of Amsterdam to NSM
would also be qualified as state aid. This was an additional reason for
Minister Van Aardenne to not approve it.107 Alderman Heerma was
furious: “It is crystal clear that this government only tries to save Rot-
terdam shipbuilding and drops Amsterdam like a hot potato.”108 Par-
liament was furious about Van Aardenne’s letter, which was
condemned by all parties.109 This condemnation had no effect on DG
IV, whose importance and influence continued to growth, which is an
indication that the polity dimension (i.e., the shifting state structure
and power relations between the actors) had changed further.
This became further evident when DG IV opened a formal investi-
gation in December 1981, as it had doubts whether earlier aids were in
compliance with the EC treaty. The Dutch government regretted this
step; in its mind, it had always informed the EC on aid packages. Civil
servants had discussed this aid package in the European multilateral
meeting on shipbuilding aids, inwhich none of the othermember states
had opposed the aid.110 A meeting between Van Aardenne and
103. Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 181.
104. Com (85) 548 final, AEI.
105. Kamerstuk II 1980/1, 14 969, nr. 60.
106. As quoted in Wassenberg, Dossier RSV, 246.
107. Kamerstuk II 1980/81, 14 969, nr. 63.
108. Heerma as quoted in Wassenberg, Dossier RSV, 257.
109. Kamerstuk II 1980/81, 14 969, nr. 66.
110. NA 2.08.107, 5595, telexes to DG IV, undated [December 1981?]; January
20, 1982.
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Andriessen on January 27, 1982, did not change Andriessen’s view on
possible “inadmissible” state aid toNSMaswell asADM. In 1982,ADM
also needed an additional 36 million guilders (worth €32 million in
2018) to survive. The city of Amsterdam was willing to loan half of the
money, but Minister Van Aardenne refused to provide any money in
November 1982, even though he thought the size of Amsterdam’s har-
bor justified a repair facility. The main reason was that the DG Compe-
tition had informed Van Aardenne that a loan to prevent imminent
bankruptcy would not be acceptedwhile earlier aid packages were still
being researched.111 DG IV had started a formal investigation into
incompatible state aid for ADM just a month prior.112 Events unfolded
so quickly that the Dutch government was not able to keep DG IV fully
informed in a timely way.113 Meanwhile, inside the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, a policy change had already set in. From 1982 onward,
civil servants in multilateral meetings on state aid in shipbuilding told
their colleagues from DG IV and member states that they would phase
out aid completely by 1985. These Dutch officials now also supported
the EC in presenting its new sixth directive to prevent a “situation of
state aid anarchy.”114
The beliefs of Parliament started to change as well; in 1980 Parlia-
ment was still highly in favor of state aid, and in 1981 Parliament had
condemned minister Van Aardenne’s aid refusal. Within a year that
position changed. When the new coalition government of CDA and
Liberals (VVD) (1982–1989)—whowere united in their goal of reducing
government spending and debt by promoting privatization—came to
power, the ruling parties were now more skeptical about aid.115 In a
debate on December 8, 1982—with themayor and aldermen of Amster-
dam in the public gallery—CDA felt that the “government should only
play an additional role” in business affairs and “governments have only
strength against market forces.” Meanwhile the VVD, in the words of
H. H. Jacobse, argued that “distortion of competition is almost always
the unintentional by-product of this type of aid, and distortion of com-
petition is most certainly not my only objection.” Despite these objec-
tions, CDA and VVD also felt that aid should be considered if an
independent report acknowledged that a profitable business in ship
repair was feasible.116 However, the position of the opposition parties
(holding 69 of the 150 seats) had not yet changed significantly. The
111. Kamerstuk II 1982/83, 17 600 XIII, nr. 15.
112. NA 2.08.107, 5596, formal notification of EC, October 13, 1982.
113. NA 2.08.107, 5595, telex to Commissioner Andriessen, January 31, 1983.
114. NA 2.08.107, 5595, Verslag June 10, 1982, 1.
115. Kroeze and Keulen, “Managerpolitiek”; Keulen and Kroeze, “De Europese
Commissie.”
116. Handelingen II 1982/83 1019, 1020.
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Communists pointed to the stream of telephone calls, letters, and
telexes from companies, municipalities, and workers who pleaded
for additional aid. Labor (PvdA), the largest opposition party, explained
that a repair facility was a public utility for the whole harbor and that it
saw no distinction between public and private ownership. Labor sim-
ply did not believe that the EC could have any objection, as “you do not
raise objections if you want to pursue a policy that [is] positively
focused.”117
In January 1983, a report by a committee of so-called wise men
addressed opportunities to keep a repair facility in the Amsterdam
harbor, at a cost of at least 50 million guilders (approximately €43.10
million in 2018) in subsidies to ADM. For this reason, Minister Van
Aardenne announced “the government has taken the position that
while it recognises the importance of ADM for the region of Amster-
dam, it must take its national responsibility and can go no further than
the 6.4 million guilders that my predecessor already has provided as a
guarantee.”118 In a debate in the Senate, Van Aardenne explained:
“Brussels is critical of these kinds of affairs. It is rightly so, because it
assesses government support and whether that is aid from the national
government or from the municipality does not matter that much. What
matters is the assessment of possible distortions of competition.”119
This decision wasmet with disbelief by the Amsterdam city govern-
ment. In an 111 hour–long attempt in front of TV cameras, two alder-
men (Heerma from the CDA and Schaefer from the PvdA) haggled for
funds from the porter’s lobby of the ADM. Workers handed in parts of
their wages and members of the public went to the city hall to donate
money.120 The last 15million guilders was foundwhen the city bought
the dockyard infrastructure from ADM to lighten the burden.121
The Amsterdam protests influenced Andriessen’s initial decision.
On April 28, 1983, it became known that Commissioner Andriessen
approved aid for ADM after all, although the EC was not notified about
Amsterdam’s purchase of the docklands. In the words of Minister Van
Aardenne: “It took a lot of effort to persuade the EC to come to a
favourable decision on ADM.” Furthermore, because of this decision,
he “saw no objection to provide restructuring aid to other parts of the
former RSV conglomerate.”122 Meanwhile, Van Aardenne never pro-
vidednewaid, probably because the EChad concluded that theywould
monitor state aid to shipbuilders even more strictly in 1983, but also
117. Handelingen II 1982/83 1015, 1018.
118. Handelingen II 1982/83 1603; Kamerstuk II 1982/83, 17600 XIII, nr. 25.
119. Handelingen I 1982/83, 531.
120. Ilse Bos, “Enneüs Heerma,”Groene Amterdammer, no. 40, October 5, 1994.
121. Kamerstuk II 1982/83 17 600 XIII, nr. 135, 3, 4.
122. Handelingen II 1982/83 3700.
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because Dutch civil servants had concluded that subsidizing was to no
avail. They told their European colleagues in June 1983: “The situation
of the shipbuilding sector is so difficult world-wide that every national
attempt of aid will be lost. A national solution is no longer possible,
everything should be seen as part of the total picture.”123
The RSV conglomerate filed for bankruptcy in the same year, after
which Parliament initiated an inquiry on the causes of this failure,
which became a national media event. The public summaries of the
questioning drew a great audience and culminated with a 6,000-page
report issued in 16 volumes and weighing 13 kilograms, published in
December 1984.124 The inquiry committee, with members from all
major parties and covering the political spectrum from the Communist
party to the orthodox Christian conservative SGP party, reached a joint
conclusion in which a change in policy is visible. For the first time, all
major parties agreed that “it is doubtful whether the struggle to keep
open the shipbuilding capacity that has been unprofitable for years as
long as possible could, for social reasons, be regarded as an acceptable
policy alternative.” The committee accepted that the problems in ship-
building were structural and that “even economic recovery would not
lead to a viable Dutch shipbuilding industry.” Pursuing a policy of
keeping the shipyards open in those circumstances had only led to a
“constant source of uncertainty and a long series of disillusions.”125
Therefore, the inquiry committee proposed a new policy for state aid:
In order to avoid hopeless aid operations, the granting of state aid
should be subject to a number of conditions: there has to be a prospect
of a return to profits, the operation has to be a one-off (so no repetitive
cases) and the aid thatwill be allowedneeds to be a reasonable amount
that does not exceed several tens of thousands of guilders per job. The
support for RSV's shipbuilding construction did not meet any of these
conditions. The operation started in 1976 requiredmore support each
year and in a single case ultimately threatened to exceed an amount of
fl. 400,000 [€333,334 in2018prices] per job. It lackedall proportion.126
The parliamentary inquiry showed the ineffectiveness of the massive
scale of state aid that was completely running out of control,127 results
that acted as a catalyst for Parliament tomove away from support for aid
(in order to maintain employment) to a blanket refusal of aid and
embracing the belief that market forces should run their course. The
123. NA 2.08.107, 5596, Verslagen June 7, 1983; September 21, 1982.
124. VPRO, De RSV-Enquête; Strath, The Politics of De-industrialization, 156.
125. Kamerstuk II 1984/5, 17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 16., 462.
126. Kamerstuk II 1984/5, 17 718 (RSV inquiry), nr. 16., 462.
127. Kroeze and Keulen, “More exciting than Watergate.”
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inquiry, therefore, finalized amajor shift in national economic policy in
which “non-intervention… became the norm.”128 No longer would the
protection of employment in vulnerable (urban) regions be a major
factor in industry economic aid decisions, and loans to certain industry
sectors were therefore seriously trimmed down. Therefore, after a
change in polity and policy, the third dimension—politics—had now
also changed because of the inquiry.
Between 1983 and 1986, the RSV conglomerate was split into six
companies. Amsterdam tried to sustain the two shipyards and protect
employment, but new attempts to sustain credit from the national
government for ADM or NSM were to no avail.129 The NSM never
recovered and was declared bankrupt in May 1984. The Amsterdam
alderman for economic affairs tried to restart the company once
more;130 nevertheless, his final attempts also failed.
The ADM fared little better. By January 1985, the company could no
longer pay its workers’wages and turned to the government oncemore.
The minister of economic affairs stated: “In case of bankruptcy, the
current financiers of the company, i.e. banks, are primarily responsible
… and for that you cannot expect a contribution from the govern-
ment.”131 He presented this as the lesson learned from the RSV inquiry,
anopinionnowshared bymost parties in Parliament. Labor bynowsaw
the bankruptcy as “unavoidable.”132 The Social Liberal party D66
emphasized: “We know the RSV history. It seems that some lessons
have been learned from it, even though mistakes have been made. The
ADM’s bankruptcy is unavoidable. Everyone acknowledges that—even
the trade unions.”133 The contribution of CDA is also illustrative of the
change that they accorded, as their spokesman in Parliament stated: “It
is widely acknowledged that the ADMhas no future in its current form.
We believe that a solution must be found in a position which has both
feet on the ground. That means market conformity and the perspective
of making profit.”134 Only certain members of the small left-wing
parties were still in favor of giving aid. One of them, MP Willems
(PSP), stated: “I must warn again that one should not be providing aid
in general. That has come to be the atmosphere after theRSVdrama.We
think that providing aid canbe veryuseful.”135TheADMrepair facility,
however, had to close its doors within a month, in February 1985.
128. Van Zanden, “The History of an Empty Box,” 188.
129. Kamerstuk II, 184/85, 18 600 XIII, nr. 87.
130. “Oud-Shell man bekijkt werf NSM,” NRC Handelsblad, June 1, 1984, 13.
131. Kamerstuk II 1984/85 18600 XIII, 87.
132. Handelingen II 1984/85, 2803.
133. Handelingen II 1984/85, 2802.
134. Handelingen II 1984/85, 2805.
135. Handelingen II 1984/85, 2801.
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When the budget for economic affairs was discussed in the Senate a
year later, a new policy paradigm clearly was established. The best
example of this is Senator Zijlstra (CDA) who, while reflecting on the
closure of ADM, pleaded to halt generic subsidies for shipbuilding as
soon as possible, by introducing the metaphor of an orange, which was
first squeezed, afterwhich the collected juicewas injected in the orange
once more, in the idle hope that it would become a beautiful orange
again. He could no longer believe this logic and “was now convinced
that the government has to take as many steps back as possible.”136
Closing off Shipyards in Europe in the 1980s
The closure of the Amsterdam shipyards illustrates a European devel-
opment. The history of the nationalized British Shipbuilders Corpora-
tion (BS) was also one of managing decline. In 1982, half of Britain’s
shipyards were closed to reduce overcapacity. The cabinet of Margaret
Thatcher (1979–1990) initiated the British Shipbuilders Act of 1983 to
denationalize the industry and break up divisions into viable private
companies, while the remaining sites were closed down. Only the
warship-building shipyard—due to successful government contracts
—seemed to be economically viable at that time. The same could not
be said for almost all other merchant shipbuilders, whose workforces
dwindled from87,000 employees in 1977 to only 5,000by1987. In 1987
government ministers guided by Kenneth Clarke (whowas responsible
for nationalized industries) proposed to liquidate the last remaining
facilities. Clarke felt that the new Sixth Shipbuilding Directive of the
Community introduced such a ceiling for state aid that the UK govern-
ment took it to be henceforth impossible for British shipbuilders to win
further contracts. Under pressure from the Secretary for Scotland, who
feared further unemployment in already highly effected areas,
Thatcher was persuaded to not dissolve BS; however, this could not
halt a further decline of British shipbuilding. By the end of the 1980s,
BS was an empty shell of a company, its last activities either sold or
scrapped.137
France and Germany also found the EC standing in their way
during their attempts to save their shipbuilding industries and main-
tain regional employment. In France, the closure of yards was
avoided by the merging of five shipyards into two companies: the
state-owned Chantiers de l’Atlantique and private company Normed.
The latter also received indirect state aid; with shipyards as far apart
136. Handelingen I 1985/86, p. 428.
137. Parker, The Official History of Privatisation, 208–210.
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as 1,000 kilometers, synergy was not at the forefront of this
operation—protection of unemployment was. Although voices
within the Ministry of Economics could be heard calling to terminate
yards to curtail overproduction, the French government promised a
crowd of protesting strikers in 1984 that no one would be laid off.
State aid became, however, very costly. The Cour des Comptes (Court
of Auditors) calculated in 1986 that the subsidy per employee was
286,000 French francs (or €73,000 in 2013), and that subsidies were
so high that it was cheaper for the French state to decline an order and
accept an increase in unemployment benefits than to actually build
new ships. Local authorities, one example being the case of Dunkirk,
also actively supported the shipyards. Alongside the unions, they
persuaded the French railroads in 1985 to order a train-ferry; a sub-
sidy of the local authorities covered 90 percent of the costs. A year
later the national shipbuilding aid policy was changed. During the
term of the Liberal prime minister Jacques Chirac (1986–1988) and
under mounting pressure of the European commissioner for compe-
tition Peter Sutherland, the state aid to Normed was terminated. The
Liberal French minister of industries, Alain Madelin, was favorable
toward the Sixth Directive on Shipbuilding, which was seen as help-
ful to reduce the burden of state aid for the French state. Normed
could not survive, and the company was liquidated. The blow of the
termination of state aid was somewhat softened by a generous social
aid package and by establishing a tax-free zone in Dunkirk to stimu-
late employment.138
Meanwhile, in Germany, shipbuilding was the sector that benefited
the most from state aid per produced product. Länder—like Bremen—
paid state aid to the shipyard, as they thought it was “politically-
psychologically” unthinkable that shipbuilding would disappear.
Out of fear of raising unemployment costs and loss of apprenticeships
and tax revenue, the Senate of Bremen assessed it would be cheaper “to
buy employment.” The federal state did not share this view in the
mid-1980s and was against state aid; however, as the federal state
was not involved in this aid, it did not feel obliged to notify the
EC. Moreover, the EC did not take a hard stance in implementing its
own policies on state aid in this matter.139
After the introduction of the Sixth Directive on Shipbuilding in
1987, the DG Competition did follow up on the Bremen case after
the director-general read in the media about new state aid from Bre-
men’s Senate. West Germany’s federal minister of economics told
138. Warlouzet, “The Collapse of the French Shipyard of Dunkirk,” 13.
139. Seevaratnam, Governing the Shipyards, 135, 136.
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Bremen’s government he “was not prepared to pull the European
Commission’s leg,” illustrating that times were changing. By the late
1980s, the Sixth Directive and European law asserted that past illegal
state aid should be repaid, stipulating that aid was only allowed when
it led to capacity reduction and improved the competitiveness of a
company. Therefore, any state aid procedure would be dangerous for
the continuation of the aid generally and the future of the Bremen
dockyards. The EC opened an investigation into German state aid in
1989, finding several measures that were incompatible with the Com-
mon Market. A year later, the EC ruled that state aid was admissible,
because Bremen had stayed well under the 28 percent limit, with
subsidies of 12.8 percent of the price.140 In short, the new active role
of DG IV and the spreading of neoliberal ideas on state aid and failing
competition, backed by rules and regulations, were clearly visible
across Europe.141
Conclusion
The closure of the Amsterdam shipyards is a good case study of a
policy paradigm shift and the roles of different actors. The story of
the Amsterdam shipyards fits into the European policy strategy of
centralization and increasing state aid to the shipbuilding industries
to prevent unemployment in the 1960s and 1970s. The Amsterdam
case epitomizes the policy paradigm shift from Keynesianism to
neoliberalism.
Our study shows that the process of change was promoted and
countered at different governance levels: i.e., local, national, and
European. As the theories of policy paradigms predicted, a new actor
in the polity can change everything quite suddenly. The EC, especially
in the form of the DG Competition, which became very influential,
played this aforementioned key transformative role. In the process of
establishing a European single market, strict state aid policies became
useful. The European and national governance level, represented by
Van Aardenne and Andriessen, accepted and promoted the emerging
new policy discourse early on. The Netherlands was one of the first
European countries in which the policy paradigm from state aid to free
trade took place. This was partly because of the specific ties between
the European commissioner and the Netherlands, and partly because
the Netherlands was singled out in the European court case of Philip
Morris. In these circumstances, Dutch civil servants changed their
140. Seevaratnam, Governing the Shipyards, 133–150, quotes pp. 135, 136, 150.
141. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe, 505.
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views, as private discussions with European colleagues illustrate, con-
tributing to a change at the policy dimension and a policy without state
aid. The Dutch cabinet was also receptive to the European pressure,
because it fit into the cabinet’s wider agenda of budget cuts and privat-
ization as a means to end the economic recession.142 The dimension of
politics was the last dimension that changed. Although changing pref-
erences can be found from 1982, it was the parliamentary inquiry that
functioned as a catalyst, as it showed the immense scale and ineffec-
tiveness of the subsidies. It led to the ultimate conclusion that
the Keynesian paradigm—massive government aid to ensure job
security—was no longer acceptable for the large political parties. State
aid was no longer seen as social—the old Keynesian argument—but as
market distortion and unprofitable—the neoliberal argument. In the
Dutch case, the acceptance of the new paradigm took about five years,
which is relatively quick compared with the other Western European
countries, and was probably the result of both early adoption by Van
Aardenne andAndriessen and the dramatic RSV inquiry. However, it is
still a more gradual and multilevel interplay than many theorists of
policy paradigm shifts suggest.
Strikingly, and despite the Netherlands’ long tradition of tripartite
bargaining in labor relations, both unions and shipbuilders did not play
a major role in the shift. The unions were, first, caught in the north–
south tension andopposing local views: in 1981, they steppedout of the
national consultations on restructuring. The executive and supervisory
boards of the shipyards, on the other hand, were highly reliant on
government loans and were in no position to protest, as well as being
unwilling to play an active role and take responsibility for this unfold-
ing failure. Certainly, after the collapse of RSV and the breakup and
closure of the conglomerate, owners became competitors once again
andaccordingly adopted the position thatmarket forces had to run their
courses.
Finally, we have illustrated the fruitfulness of the multilevel gover-
nance approach for historical research into policy change. Both the
EuropeanCommunity andAmsterdamwere very influential in shaping
the debate; they had direct contact with civil servants, ministers, and
MPs who echoed their arguments. That Amsterdam did not succeed in
sustaining aid can be explained through the concept of a policy para-
digm shift: The change was too extensive, similar to what happened in
other places in Western Europe, where state aid and subsidies were
phased out and many local governments had to accept “their” ship-
yards being closed in the 1980s.
142. Kroeze and Keulen, “Managerpolitiek.”
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